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The U.S. corporate income tax system is outdated,' overly prescriptive,2 and too complex and
oppressive3 to respond efficiently and effectively to global business.4 As highlighted by 26 U.S.C.
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1. See, e.g., Mihir A. Desai & James R. Hines, Jr., Old Rules and New Realities: Corporate Tax Policy in a
Global Setting, 57 NAT'L TAx J. 937, 937 (2004), available at http://www.bus.umich.edu/otpr/wp2004-I0.pdf
(explaining that today's tax rules represent yesterday's realities); Rachelle Y. Holmes, Deconstructing the Rules
ofCorporate Tax, 25 AKRON TAX J. 1, 3 (2010) (noting that the international U.S. tax rules have not been
revised since 1962 and that the general corporate tax system has not been overhauled since 1986).
2. For a thorough analysis of the prescriptive nature of the U.S. corporate tax rules and the benefits of
rewriting them to include principles-based rules, see generally Holmes, slpra note 1.
3. See JIMi SAXTON, Joi,'-r ECON. Cosvw., REFORMING THE U.S. CORPORATE TAX SYSTFMA to IN-
CREASE TAX COMPpTirIvNESS 1 (2005) [hereinafter JEC], available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa-
pers.cfm?abstract id=732503 (stating that "U.S. corporate tax laws have grown into a patchwork of overly
complex, inefficient, and unfair provisions ...."); Holmes, svpra note 1, at 10-15 (describing the complexity
of the U.S. tax rules).
4. See generally JEC, svpra note 3 (describing the inefficiencies of the U.S. corporate tax system and its
costs and burdens on U.S. multinationals); Michael C. Durst, International Tax Reform and a Corporate Rate
Cut for Stimulus, Efficiency, and Fairness, 53 TAX NOTES INT'L 313, 314 (2009) (stating that the international
provisions are among the most wasteful and inefficient elements of the U.S. tax system); Holmes, supra note
1, at I (stating that "[t]he U.S. corporate tax system is failing to keep pace with the evolving global economic
landscape"); see also Ilan Benshalom, Sourcing the "Unsourceable': The Cost Sharing Regulations and the Sourcing
of Affiliated Intangible-Related Transactions, 26 VA. TAX REV. 631, 633-41 (2007) (explaining the global nature
of business as related to the U.S. tax rules); Craig M. Boise, Breaking Open Offshore Piggybanks: Deferral and
the Utility of Amnesty, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 667, 667-70 (2007) (discussing U.S. MINEs foreign-source
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§ 965, the international provisions are especially stale.5 Yet, multinational enterprise (MNE) in-
come dominates the business environment,6 and cross border transactions are on the rise.
7
I recommend placing global business concepts and the international tax code provisions at the
center of restructured rules that include the following: new entity definitions and transaction/source
rules that reflect evolving business realities; a strengthened worldwide system capable of encompass-
ing border-defying income activitys; principles-based standards to remain dynamic and relevant, as
well as to simplify the Internal Revenue Code and Treasury Regulations and to clarify congressional
intent; ending deferral for U.S. foreign-source income; reducing the overall corporate income tax
rate; and integrating the corporate and individual income tax systems according to the Comprehen-
sive Business Income Tax (CBIT) prototype put forth by the U.S. Treasury Department.9
I. Introduction
The U.S. corporate income tax regime is a disaster. U.S. corporations seek to escape
the home jurisdiction, primarily because, in staying, they are forced to deal with the U.S.
corporate income tax system.'0 The high U.S. tax rate is glaringly so, and the system in
general is burdensome.'I This reality is felt internationally. 12 Foreign and domestic in-
vestments in the United States are declining.'3 At the same time, increased international
income tax avoidance); see generally David S. Miller, Unintended Consequences: How U.S. Tax Law Encourages
Investment in Offibore Tax Havens, in NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW COLLOQUIUM ON TAx
POLICY AND PUBLIC FINANCE (2011), available at http://www.law.nyu.edu/ecm-dlv3/groups/public/@nyu-
law.website.academics.colloquia-taxpolicy/documents/documents/ecm-pro_06 7 8 12.pdf (outlining the
U.S. tax Code features that encourage U.S. multinationals to take advantage of international commerce to
defer U.S. taxes offshore); Daniel Shaviro, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture, The Rising Tax-Electivity of U.S.
Corporate Residence, 64 TAx L. REv. 377, 377-80 (2011) (highlighting the tax disadvantages. of incorporating in
the United States).
5. See I.R.C. § 965 (2005). All references hereinafter to I.R.C. are to the Internal Revenue Code of 2005,
as amended.
6. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State, 113
HARV. L. REv. 1573, 1588-90 (2000) (describing international investments by U.S. entities); Boise, supra note
4, at 668 (discussing substantial erosion of the U.S. tax base).
7. See JOINT Comm1. ON TAXATION, PRESENT LAW AND ISSUES IN U.S. TAXATION OF CROSS-BORDER
INCOME 2-19 (2011) [hereinafter JCT] (presenting data and issues related to increasing cross-border trade
and investment).
8. A territorial system's reach is limited to national boundaries and thus inappropriate for cross-border
value creation. See id. at 80-81.
9. See DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, IN-TEGRATION OF THE INDWIDUAL AND CORPORATE TAx SYSTEMS:
TAXING BUSINESS INCOME ONCE, at viii, x, 39-60 (1992) [hereinafter INTEGRATION]. The CBIT represents
a long-term, comprehensive integration option. See id. The CBIT would help to simplify taxation in the
United States, treat debt and equity equally, treat corporate and non-corporate entities equally, and reduce
the tax distortions between retained and distributed earnings. See id. at 39.
10. Shaviro, supra note 4, at 377-78.
11. Id.
12. Id.; see generally ROBERT CARROLL, TAx FOUND., THE IMPORTANCE OF TAx DEFERRAL AND A
LOWER CORPORATE TAx RATE, SPECIAL REPORT (2010), available at http://taxfoundation.org/article/im-
portance-tax-deferral-and-lower-corporate-tax-rate; Holmes, supra note 1, at 15-17.
13. See David Malpass & Stephen Moore, America's Troubling Investment Gap, WALL ST. J., July 5, 2011, at
A15 (stating that the United States is losing growth capital). In spite of positive numbers put forth by the
White House, overall foreign direct investment in the United States is declining. See id. Further, U.S. in-
vestment is leaving the United States at a faster rate than foreign investment is arriving. See id.
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investment in tax-haven nations has become a global concern for Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, including the United States. 14
The U.S. income tax system is the number one incentive for multinational enterprises
(MNEs) to elect foreign over U.S. incorporation. 15 It is why U.S. multinationals are
choosing to do business offshore rather than at home. 16 What is more, U.S. taxes pre-
clude U.S. NEs from bringing their foreign income back to the United States
(repatriating). 17
Because the United States does not tax the foreign income of foreign corporations, U.S.
MNEs that incorporate and earn income overseas can defer, or put-off, U.S. taxation for
as long as they keep their earnings abroad.' 8 Many U.S. MNEs continue deferral indefi-
nitely. 19 As such, the U.S. corporate tax system is essentially a barrier, preventing U.S.
foreign income from supporting U.S. revenue20 or reaching the U.S. capital market.
21
The system is backfiring on itself. The U.S. tax base is eroding, 22 the United States is
losing its international standing as a desirable place to invest,23 and the U.S. market in
general is losing its capital base.24
The Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) has expressed great concern regarding the
U.S. market effects of U.S. MINE taxation.25 Multinationals are "shifting ...invest-
ment[s] to low-tax jurisdictions" and "structuring investments in high-tax jurisdictions to
take advantage of low rates elsewhere .... -26 The committee noted that consequences of
the current corporate tax rules include "uncertain implications for U.S. investment and
employment; and incentives to incorporate a business [and earn income] outside the
United States." 27
To respond to the JCT, we must consider U.S. taxes within an international context. If
the United States seeks to bring its corporate income home, it must think like its corpora-
tions do. It must aggressively capture value. It must also draw business back to the
United States, enabling NINEs to earn their greatest returns onshore. The bottom line is
that the United States must improve its corporate income tax system as a whole from the
14. See generally ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEv., HARMFUL TAX COMPETmION: AN EMERG-
ING GLOBAL ISSUE (1998) [hereinafter OECD REPORT] (discussing the issues of harmful tax competition,
identifying factors associated with harmful tax regimes, and recommending measures for counteracting harm-
ful taxation).
15. See Miller, supra note 4, at 3-4; Shaviro, supra note 4, at 377-78.
16. Shaviro, supra note 4, at 377-78.
17. JCT, supra note 7, at 69-79; Miller, supra note 4, at 3-4.
18. Boise, supra note 4, at 667-68.
19. Id.
20. Holmes, smpra note 1, at 10-15 (describing the system complexity that encourages entities to go to great
lengths to its exploit gaps and loopholes); see generally Miller, supra note 4, at 12-14 (explaining deferral and
avoidance vehicles).
21. See JEC, supra note 3, at 6-7.
22. JCT, supra note 7, at 69-71.
23. See Matthew Salonarsh, U.S. Slips to Fifth Place on Competitiveness List, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 7, 2011, at B9
(reporting that the United States' standing has declined for the third year in a row). The results were attribu-
table to "some aspects of the United States' institutional environment." Id.
24. JCT, supra note 7, at 69-79.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 69.
27. Id.
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inside out to meet everyone's best interests. I propose that this can be done, but only
under a fully rehabilitated construct as recommended here.
Part II of this paper outlines the issues plaguing the U.S. corporate income tax system.
It describes the system, how it fails to meet practical realities, and the effects of those
failings. Part II presents the experiment of 26 U.S.C. § 96528 and its results. Section 965
temporarily allowed repatriation of U.S. foreign subsidiary income at sharply reduced
rates.29 This law drew MINE foreign-source income home, indicating a wealth of poorly
addressed offshore U.S. resources. 30 Part TV provides recommendations for restructuring
the U.S. corporate income tax system. Part V concludes.
II. Issues Plaguing the U.S. Corporate Income Tax System
A. THE U.S. CORPORATE NCOME TAx STRUCTURE ENCOURAGES DEFERRAL
1. The Worldwide U.S. Income Tax System
The U.S. corporate income tax structure encourages deferral.31 It does this by leaving
gaps in the rules that would capture income for revenue. 32 Understanding these gaps
begins with an understanding of the United States' worldwide income tax structure.
The United States operates a worldwide income tax system.33 This means that the
United States taxes its residents on income generated anywhere in the world. 34 To relieve
U.S. residents of the burden of doubly paying U.S. and foreign taxes on the same income
earned abroad, the United States offers credits to its residents against foreign taxes paid. 35
Many other nations exercise territorial systems, taxing their residents only on income
generated within their home countries. 36 Canada, France, Germany, and the Nether-
lands, for example, have all operated primarily territorial systems for years. 37 In 2009,
Great Britain and Japan also both transitioned from worldwide to territorial systems, leav-
28. See I.R.C. § 965.
29. See id. §965(a)(1).
30. See id.
31. Deferral refers to the (act that foreign-source income of overseas companies owned or controlled by
U.S. corporations or individuals is not taxed unless or until that income is distributed to the U.S. sharehold-
ers. U.S. tax is then imposed on the U.S. shareholders' income, rather than on any income of the foreign
corporations. SeeJol-r CoMM. ON INIrERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, U.S. TAXATION OF FOREIGN SOURCE
INCOME - DEFERRAL AND EHE FOREIGN TAX CREDIT 2 (1975) [hereinafter DEFERRAL], available at http:II
www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=4049; see generally Miller, setpra note 4.
32. DEFERRAL, supra note 31, at 2; see generally Miller, supra note 4.
33. JCT, supra note 7, at 20-21.
34. Id. The United States also taxes foreign parties on income generated through business and trade with
the United States. Id. "International law recognizes the right of each sovereign nation to regulate conduct
[in this case to tax] based on a nexus of the conduct to the territory of the nation or to a person ... whose
status links the person to the nation ...." Id. The United States' right to tax its residents on their worldwide
income stems from their residential connections to the United States. Id. The country's right to tax foreign
parties on their U.S.-related income stems from that income's relation to the home territory. Id. In this way,
the U.S. system is somewhat of a hybrid, taxing both worldwide and territorial income. Id. Only the foreign
income of foreign parties is not taxed in the United States. Id.
35. Id. at 21.
36. Carroll, supra note 12, at 2 (noting that "[o]ver 80 percent of [developed nations] now have territorial
systems . . . ").
37. JEC, supra note 3, at 3.
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ing the United States in the minority of OECD countries still operating worldwide
systems. 38
Whether the United States should continue to operate a worldwide system or should
move to a territorial regime is the subject of much debate. 39 A territorial system would
exempt U.S. foreign-source income from U.S. taxation, making U.S. MNEs more com-
petitive. 40 As territorial systems rule the day, corporations from worldwide systems are at
a disadvantage, paying home-country taxes on all income while their territorial counter-
parts' foreign income is earned free of home-country taxation. 41 The value of incorporat-
ing within a territorial system is undeniable. 42 Territorial systems can also be simpler to
administer than worldwide systems, which must track corporate income around the
globe.43
But, in the long term, the United States would likely not benefit from limiting taxation
to its physical borders. Per Desai and Hines, "the available evidence suggests that, both in
magnitude and in character, foreign income, and its taxation by foreign countries and the
United States, continue to grow in importance over time."44 This is precisely why the
United States must strengthen its worldwide income tax structure. The United States
must use all available data to re-design a system that will allow it to excel on its own terms,
and not merely to compete by attempting to keep up with others' policies, prevailing or
not.
Distributive notions underlie the validity of the worldwide system. 45 The U.S. income
tax system attempts to distribute the tax burden across all areas where income accrues,
taxing earnings from capital and labor.46 Capital income migrates more easily across bor-
ders than human labor.47 Thus, a territorial system would exempt mobile capital income
from taxation, leaving the primary tax burden on the less mobile national labor force.48
38. Carroll, supra note 12, at 2.
39. See Benshalom, supra note 4, at 633-34 (discussing the issue as a "source of contention, embodying
vehement academic and political debates .... ); Shaviro, supra note 4, at 378-79 (noting "[tihe long and
frequently vociferous debate about whether the United States should seek to strengthen its worldwide taxa-
tion of resident companies, or instead follow the rest of the world by moving towards exemption .
40. JEC, supra note 3, at 4.
41. Id.
42. See Shaviro, supra note 4, at 378 (noting the high cost of U.S. incorporation relative to territorial system
business costs).
43. SeeJCT, supra note 7, at 20-21 (generally describing the domestic and foreign transactions of which the
United States must keep track in taxing worldwide income); Avi-Yonah, s-pra note 6, at 1583-84 (describing
difficulties in tracking worldwide income "[e]ven [for] sophisticated tax administrations like the IRS .
44. Desai & Hines, supra note 1, at 939.
45. Avi-Yonah, supra note 6, at 1576-78. But see Shaviro, supra note 4, at 394-95 (explaining that the distri-
butional analysis of worldwide taxation is sensitive to whether taxation occurs at the entity or individual
levels).
46. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 6, at 1576-78 (explaining the distributive underpinnings of developed nation
income taxation).
47. See id.
48. See id. (explaining the chain of events. that occurs when foreign income is taxed at a lower rate than
domestic income, causing capital to flee the home jurisdiction and the tax base to shift toward labor); see also
Durst, supra note 4, at 314 (stating that the burden of the corporate tax falls on labor and "middle-income
earners, whose retirement and other savings plans own stock in the corporations that must pay the tax .
This means that the tax dampens national investment and employment.).
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The worldwide system attempts to capture income from capital that has grown and bene-
fited from the home jurisdiction even when it elects to move overseas. 49
An educated understanding of the worldwide versus territorial discussion requires a
multi-step assessment of how income taxes work globally, including how nations tax for-
eign parties doing business within their borders and the rates at which nations tend to
exchange foreign investors. 50 This paper examines the reasoning behind choosing either
system to ask specifically how it relates to the increasingly borderless corporate income
environment. The simple answer to this question (in favor of a worldwide system as de-
scribed in Part IV below) makes the rest of the debate moot.
The current U.S. system provides a worldwide context for U.S. taxation,5' but fails to
effectively utilize its platform.5 2 The system's foundational provisions were conceived
when domestic commerce prevailed. 53 Income was associated with physical business pres-
ence isolated within national borders. 54 As business evolves beyond these concepts, the
outdated U.S. rules leave gaps in the intended worldwide net, failing to reach and capture
all U.S. income streams.55
2. Income Tax Gaps: The Legal Status of U.S. Corporations
The United States, of course, treats corporations as distinct legal persons56 and taxes
corporations separately in conjunction with their separate juridical status.5 7 Corporations
and their shareholders each pay separate taxes on income earned.58 One of the keys that
helps to create a tax gap relative to separate corporate taxation is the meaning of income
earned.59 U.S. taxes are only owed when they are realized 60 by a U.S. resident or a person
engaged in business or trade within the United States.61 When a U.S. parent company
establishes a foreign subsidiary, it generally organizes a wholly foreign corporation for
which it (the U.S. parent) is the primary shareholder.62 This.allows the U.S. MNE to
49. See JEC, supra note 3, at 1-6 (describing capital mobility and worldwide system taxation).
50. See Shaviro, supra note 4, at 385-412 (analyzing issues related to worldwide taxation).
51. See JCT, supra note 7, at 20-21.
52. Desai & Hines, supra note 1, at 937-38.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.; see generally Benshalom, supra note 4.
56. See I.R.C. § 11 (imposing tax on corporations); see also BLACK'S LAW DICTnONARY 24 (9th ed. 2009)
(defining a corporation as "[a]n entity (usu. a business) having authority under law to act as a single person
distinct from the shareholders who own it" or "a group or succession of persons established in accordance
with legal rules into a legal or juristic person that has a legal personality distinct from the natural persons who
make it up .... ).
57. Separate-legal-person status differentiates corporations from their shareholders for liability purposes.
Thomas B. Andersen, W"at Form Should a New Business Take?, WILLIAMS, BIRNBERG & ANDERSEN, L.L.P.,
http://www.wba-law.com/res/business.pdf (last visited June 4, 2012). Our separate taxation of corporations is
a corollary to the separateness concept. Id.
58. See I.R.C. § 61(a)(7) (defining dividends as separate income); see also INTEGRATION, supra note 9, at I
(describing as classical the U.S. tax system's separate treatment of corporations and their investors and ex-
plaining that economic distortions result from this double tax).
59. See id. § 1001.
60. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.61-1 (stating that "[g]ross income includes income realized in any form .....
61. See JCT, supra note 7, at 20-21 (explaining the principles underlying taxation of U.S. residents' world-
wide and foreign parties' U.S.-related income).
62. See Boise, supra note 4, at 672-74 (introducing and explaining the "Principles Underlying Deferral").
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establish a foreign subsidiary whose income is wholly separate from its U.S. parent's in-
come, and can therefore escape U.S. tax. 63
Under the rules, a U.S. corporation can establish a foreign subsidiary corporation that is
a separate legal entity from its U.S. parent,64 is not a U.S. resident, 65 and is not engaged in
business or trade within the United States.66 If the subsidiary's income is foreign, and the
parent realizes no income from exchanges with or distributions from the subsidiary, the
United States cannot tax the subsidiary's earnings at all. 67
This un-taxable foreign-source income is commonly known as "deferred" income.68
The term implies that potential U.S. income is temporarily delayed. If this income were
returned to the United States, it would be taxed here. But this income may never be
"repatriated. '69 There is no legal requirement that corporations must repatriate their for-
eign-source earnings within a certain time-frame, or at all. 70
3. Income Tax Gaps: The Rules' Entity and Source Concepts
The landscape of international business now makes the Internal Revenue Code's (IRC
or the Code) and Treasury Regulations' definitions and foundational concepts unhelpful
in effectively raising revenue from capital. 71 The provisions that relate entities and in-
come to the United States are problematic. 72 They encourage deferral. 73 Put bluntly, the
rules fail to link modern economic activity to taxation. 74
The Code defines a U.S. corporation simply as one that was legally organized in the
United States. 75 Related entities escape U.S. taxation by organizing elsewhere. 76 In real-
ity, however, foreign and U.S. corporations often generate value together, yet parse rights,
responsibilities, and earnings in ways that defy historic U.S. tax notions.77
63. See id. at 667-76.
64. BLACK'S LAW DicnoNARv, supra note 56, at 24.
65. See I.R.C. § 7701(a)(4)-(a)(5) (stating that a foreign corporation is one that is not created or organized
in the United States).
66. See Boise, supra note 4, at 673 (explaining that corporations formed and earning income solely abroad
are legally unrelated to and untaxable by the United States unless or until their income is realized at some
point by U.S. residents). Because U.S. corporations and their shareholders are taxed separately and distinctly,
this remains true when the persons (natural or juridical) organizing the foreign corporations are U.S. persons.
Id. at 672-76 (explaining the "Principles Underlying Deferral").
67. See I.R.C. §§ 881-882 (imposing income tax only on foreign corporations receiving income from within
the United States or engaged in trade or business within the United States).
68. See Boise, npra note 4, at 667.
69. See id. at 667-68.
70. See JCT, supra note 7, at 70 (noting the ability to retain earnings in a foreign subsidiary as the principal
advantage of deferral); see also Boise, supra note 4, at 667-68 (stating that U.S. corporations may never repatri-
ate foreign earnings). Boise describes U.S. foreign subsidiaries as "offshore piggybanks." Id. at 667.
71. See Benshalom, supra note 4, at 633-37.
72. See id.; see also Avi-Yonah, supra note 6, at 1575-77 (discussing problems related to taxing present-day
capital income under current income tax structures).
73. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 6, at 1593; see also Miller, supra note 4, at 5 (indicating that deferral stems
from the rules' failure to accurately reflect the nature of multinational corporate income).
74. See Benshalom, supra note 4, at 641.
75. See I.R.C. § 7701(a)(4).
76. See generally Miller, supra note 4 (detailing the many U.S. tax avoidance incentives for organizing for-
eign corporations).
77. See Benshalom, supra note 4, at 633-51 (outlining the ways MNEs generate value).
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"The new actors are able to manipulate different sources of income flows to minimize
tax liability, and thus to dismantle historic links between geographic borders and effective
national fiscal jurisdiction." 78 For M'Es as umbrella corporations, income is created
when value increases. 79 Several jurisdictions and units may be involved.80 Multinational
income is no longer jurisdiction specific.81 Outdated geographical and legal partitions no
longer reflect the MNE as an economic value generating, or income generating, unit.82
Though long held, the United States' determination to tax its entities solely according
to the site of their legal organization is arbitrary and can be altered.8 3 Entities could be
defined for tax purposes by their sites of management and control,8 4 by their consumer
markets, 85 by the legal and market jurisdictions that enable their growth and develop-
ment,8 6 by the resident status of the natural persons with whom they are ultimately affili-
ated, by some combination of these standards, or by standards yet to be devised.8 7
The United States could tax U.S. and related foreign businesses according to the value
they generate together as integrated entities. 88 For example, U.S. foreign subsidiary in-
come could be taxable to the United States, unless it could be proved that the subsidiary's
income did not benefit from the parent jurisdiction. Considering the importance of the
U.S. business development and consumer markets, this argument may be difficult for a
U.S. foreign subsidiary to prove.89 Such a tax structure would require expanding histori-
78. Id. at 638-39.
79. Id. at 642.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 633-51.
82. Id. "Put differently, income is conceptualized as the change of value within a specific economic unit
over a designated period of time. Integrated MNEs are economic units operating in several jurisdictions and
through several corporate entities. Accordingly, trying to forge significance into geographical, legal, or na-
tional boundaries to divide the MNE's single economic unit for sourcing purposes thus seems antithetical to
income's conceptual anchor." Id. at 634 n.45.
83. The legal notion associating taxes with corporate organization grew logically. Corporate finance issues
are inherently engaged when establishing a corporation because organizing is undertaken to protect share-
holders from corporate liability. Isolating corporations for liability means protecting corporate and share-
holder dollars. But taxation and liability are distinct legal concepts and can be unbraided. Furthermore,
taxing solely according to the site of organization is no longer apropos. We can tax corporations and their
shareholders, or corporations and their subsidiaries, in new ways while still holding corporations separate for
liability purposes.
The United States has built other legal concepts upon the link between corporations' legal status and their
finances. Seegenerally Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (holding that the government could not
suppress political speech based on the speaker's identity as a corporation). Citizens United upholds corporate
political spending based on corporations' separate legal person status, growing the concept of corporate per-
son-ness to allow corporate financial participation in the political process. Unhitching taxation from corpo-
rate separate person status may or may not relate to how the United States applies legal person status in other
contexts.
84. See Boise, supra note 4, at 676 (suggesting that the United States may alter the definition of a foreign
corporation to reflect the corporation's place of management and control).
85. See Avi-Yonah, spra note 6, at 1586-87, 1670-74 (discussing taxing multinationals in their consump-
tion, or demand, markets).
86. See id. at 1586-87 (discussing taxing income relative to its supply jurisdiction; Avi-Yonah's supply juris-
diction concept relates taxation to production). Here, I relate taxation to a product's development jurisdic-
tion, which may precede and differ from the eventual production jurisdiction.
87. See id. at 1580.
88. See Benshalom, supra note 4, at 642 (highlighting MNE value generation).
89. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 6, at 1670-71 (discussing the importance of OECD consumer markets).
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cal Code ideas that tie supposedly immobile income to geographic borders.90 Realisti-
cally, today's income is often mobile and border-defying. 9 1 The Code provisions that
assess transactions and determine income sources must therefore grow to embrace evolv-
ing business. 9 2
U.S. and foreign MINEs no longer fall into the static tax concepts reflected in the U.S.
rules and developed when income and production were grounded by a fixed physical busi-
ness presence. 93 Today's entities can avoid and abuse U.S. taxes because they operate on a
level that our outdated provisions do not reach.94 Modern entities absolutely take advan-
tage of our inert standards to structure their subsidiaries, transactions, and income to de-
fer, and indefinitely avoid, U.S. tax. 95
4. Deferral
Because deferral results in un-taxable income, the United States has long been trying to
combat it.96 IRC Subpart F denies deferral for certain income. 97 Subpart F is the part of
the Code that outlines the U.S. income tax anti-deferral rules for income sources outside
the United States defined as Controlled Foreign Corporations (CFCs).98 Among other
things, Subpart F defines when a foreign corporation is controlled by U.S. shareholders
for income tax purposes, 99 and what qualifies as income under Subpart F.100 It is devoted
to specifying when the U.S. parent of a CFC must claim foreign-source income on its
U.S. tax return.1 0 1 The rules recognize that a parent corporation may structure its trans-
actions and entities to unjustly defer U.S. income that would be taxable to the United
States if not moved offshore.
10 2
Subpart F attempts to regulate deferral activity by exhausting a list of transactions from
which income must be claimed for U.S. tax. 10 3 MNEs, however, have grown increasingly
skilled at finding ways to ensure that their foreign subsidiary income does not trigger the
90. See Benshalom, smpra note 4, at 638-39 (discussing historic notions of fiscal jurisdiction); Miller, supra
note 4, at 5 (noting that the U.S. anti-deferral rules were intended to represent immobile income, but that
intention is not reality).
91. Miller, supra note 4, at 5; Benshalom, supra note 4, passim.
92. See Benshalom, supra note 4, at 634-35 (discussing the inadequacies of current sourcing conventions).
93. Benshalom, supra note 4, passim.
94. See id. (describing the problem of relating multinational income to taxation); Avi-Yonah, supra note 6,
passim (describing legal issues related to taxing multinationals); Holmes, supra note 1, at 1-11, 21-53 (describ-
ing the failings of prescriptive rules).
95. See generally Miller, supra note 4.
96. See DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, THE DEFERRAL OF INCOME EARNED THROUGH U.S. CONTROLLED
FOREIGN CORPORATIONS, A POLICY STUDY 12-14 (2000) (hereinafter CFCs STUDY] (discussing historical
concerns and laws related to combating deferral).
97. I.R.C. 5§ 951-965; see DEFERRAL, supra note 31, at 2 (explaining the tax concepts at the core of Subpart
F).
98. I.R.C. 5§ 951-965.
99. I.R.C. § 957 (stating that a corporation is a CFC if more than 50 percent of: "(1) the total combined
voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote, or (2) the total value of the stock of such a corporation, is
owned . . .or is considered as owned . . .by United States shareholders .... ).
100. See I.R.C. § 952 (defining as income the sum of several listed income sources).
101. See I.R.C. § 951 (defining when CFC income must be included in the gross income of U.S.
shareholders).
102. CFCs STUDY, supra note 95, at 12-14.
103. I.R.C. §§ 951-965.
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Subpart F rules (does not resemble income on the list) and can therefore remain offshore,
unclaimed and untaxed in the United States. °4 "At present, U.S. multinationals have
more than $10 trillion invested abroad, including at least $1 trillion of foreign earn-
ings."0 5 Ending deferral could return $11 billion to $60 billion in annual U.S. tax
revenue. 1
06
As described, deferral is simply a consequence of gaps in the U.S. income tax struc-
ture. 07 Moreover tax avoidance, or taking advantage of these gaps, is legal.' 08 It is allow-
able to position oneself to maximize income while minimizing taxes owed.'0 9
Multinationals must avoid U.S. tax to compete in an increasingly global marketplace in
which the U.S. tax rate is proportionately too high,I 0 and the complex U.S. rules require
corporate contortions.I' Though Subpart F would direct NINEs through a patchwork of
transactional provisions, MNEs can sometimes achieve more reasonable exchanges by
avoiding U.S. tax and Subpart F.112 Where deferral is concerned, however, the line be-
tween avoidance and evasion can be difficult to discern. 113
Deferral is the principal tax incentive to operate through a foreign subsidiary or to
organize a foreign corporation in general.114 The benefits of operating through a foreign
subsidiary and avoiding Subpart F income are maximized if the subsidiary can be located
in a low-tax, or no-tax, jurisdiction. 115 That way, if the MNIE achieves deferral and avoids
Subpart F, its subsidiary income will be minimally taxed, if it is taxed at all, resulting in
.maximum investment returns. 116
The outdated rules encourage four main avenues for achieving deferral and avoiding
Subpart F in global business.'7 The rules also provide numerous other incentives to op-
104. See Miller, supra note 4, passim (delineating MNE activities designed to avoid the Subpart F rules).
105. Shaviro, supra note 4, at 380.
106. Miller, supra note 4, at 7.
107. Boise, supra note 4, at 668; CFCs STUDY, supra note 96, at 1-4.
108. See Boise, supra note 4, at 668 (distinguishing tax evasion from deferral). Tax avoidance is simply tax
planning to minimize amounts owed. See Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935) (stating that, "[t]he
legal ight of a taxpayer to decrease the amount of what otherwise would be his taxes, or altogether avoid
them, by means which the law permits, cannot be doubted." Under U.S. case law, tax avoidance differs from
tax evasion in that it is not criminal.). Under I.R.C. § 7201, however, "[any person who willfully attempts in
any manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed by this title or the payment thereof shall, in addition to other
penalties provided by law, be guilty of a felony .... " I.R.C. § 7201.
109. Heivering, 293 U.S. at 469 (recognizing the legal right of taxpayers to decrease or avoid tax payments).
110. See Durst, supra note 4, at 314 (discussing the "uncompetitively high" U.S. tax rate); see also Carroll,
supra note 12, at 5-6 (highlighting the U.S. corporate tax rate as "increasingly out-of-line internationally,"
and advocating that a reduced rate would alone, or with other restructuring changes, improve U.S. corporate
tax).
111. Miller, supra note 4, at 3.
112. Id.
113. See generally JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARcH SERV., R40623, TAX HAvENS: INTERNATIONAL
TAX AvoIDANCE AND EvAsiON passim (2009) (examining techniques used to evade and avoid U.S. income tax
payments on foreign earnings). In Gravelle's report, the distinction between international tax avoidance and
tax evasion is very thin, if at all clear. See id.
114. Miller, supra note 4, at 3-4.
115. Id. at4.
116. Id. at 3-9.
117. Id. at 9-12.
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erate through a foreign corporation. '8 The main types of activities that achieve deferral
are (1) transfer pricing; (2) allocating interest expenses; (3) contract manufacturing and
similar agreements; and (4) the use of hybrid entities and instruments. 119
a. The Four Main Deferral Activities
i. Tranfer Pricing
The largest MNEs own and profit from mobile information assets, such as intellectual
property and other intangibles.12 Under the rules, these purely technological products
are ideal for avoiding taxation within horizontally integrated international business mod-
els.121 MNEs operating such models can arrange cash flows by dividing rights and risks
among their various international units.122 In such scenarios, shifts in ownership and con-
trol are available through mere mouse clicks, and tax sensitive transactions can migrate
across borders to the greatest value-returning environments. 123
U.S. multinationals can develop intellectual property and intangibles in the United
States, and then transfer ownership to subsidiaries in low-tax jurisdictions. 124 The subsid-
iaries then license the properties back to the U.S. corporations. 125 Alternatively, the sub-
sidiaries can manufacture in the low-tax jurisdictions and then sell the properties back to
the United States units for distribution. 126 The entities in the low-tax jurisdictions pay
minimal amounts to buy the products from the U.S. firms.127 The low-tax entities then
own the products and claim most of the income related to their use. 128 Such income is
118. Id. at 19-48 (stating that these incentives include avoiding federal limitations on miscellaneous itemized
deductions, avoiding alternative minimum tax limitations on deductibility, avoiding the "taxable mortgage
pool" rules, and avoiding cancellation of indebtedness income).
119. Id. at 9-12.
120. Benshalom, supra note 4, at 645-48.
121. See id. passim (describing the problems associated with designing source and transaction definitions that
properly embrace mobile technological assets).
122. Id.; see Jesse Drucker, IRS Auditing How Google Shifted Profits, BLOOMBERG, Oct. 13, 2011, http://www.
bloomberg.com/news/print/2011-10-13/irs-auditing-how-google-shifted-profits-offshore-to-avoid-taxes.
html (reporting that companies including Google, Cisco, Facebook Inc., Microsoft, and the pharmaceutical
company Forest Laboratories have all been able to easily move profits from valuable patents and copyrights to
tax haven nations. Often these assets are allocated to addresses with no employees or working offices).
123. Benshalom, supra note 4, at 648; Avi-Yonah, supra note 6, at 1587.
124. Miller, supra note 4, at 9.
125. Id.; see also Michael Avramovich, Intercompany Transfer Pricing Regulations Under Internal Revenue Code
Section 482: The Noose Tightens on Multinational Corporations, 28 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 915, 927-29 (1995)
(illustrating intercompany transfer pricing); JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-37-10, PRsENT LAW AND
BACKGROUND RELATED TO POSSIBLE INCOME SmH-roNG AND TRANSFER PRICING 11-17 (2010) [hereinaf-
ter T-PicriNG] (explaining business restructuring and transfer pricing); JCT, supra note 7, at 22 (describing
transfer pricing); see also Drucker, supra note 122 (reporting that Google developed certain technology in the
United States, and then transferred the technology to a subsidiary in Bermuda through an intra-company
transaction. After the exchange, profits from the technology would be earned overseas rather than in the
United States, where they would have otherwise been subject to the high U.S. tax rate. The IRS approved
the transfer price associated with the transaction, but is looking into transfer prices that Google's subsidiaries
paid to Google in the United States for other intangibles).
126. See T-PinciNG, supra note 125, at 11-17 (outlining transfer pricing issues and techniques).
127. See id.; Avi-Yonah, supra note 6, at 1591; Avramovich, supra note 124, at 927-29; Benshalom, supra note
4, at 645-48; Drucker, supra note 122; Miller, supra note 4, at 9.
128. See T-PRIciNG, supra note 125, at 11-17; Avi-Yonah, supra note 6, at 1591; Avramovich, supra note 125,
at 927-29; Benshalom, supra note 4, at 645-48; Drucker, supra note 122; Miller, supra note 4, at 9.
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then lightly taxed or not taxed at all.' 29 The entities in the high tax jurisdictions pay use
and licensing fees or purchase prices to the low-tax product owners. 130 The high-tax enti-
ties earn little or no profit due to these payments. 31 High incomes are achieved in the
low-tax jurisdictions, and low incomes or losses are had in the high-tax jurisdictions.)32 As
an integrated entity, the MINE defies borders to maximize overall value while the high-tax
jurisdiction may be losing out on revenue. 33 It can be difficult to assess suspect transac-
tions for validity. 134
The U.S. rules proscribe transfers that would unjustly avoid U.S. tax.' 35 But attempts
to determine the true economic location and value of intangibles and other assets through
established transfer pricing methods are often inappropriate, overly prescriptive, and easy
to avoid.' 36 To determine whether NINEs' intangibles transactions are legitimate or are
designed to skirt U.S. taxes, transactions are appraised according to an arm's length stan-
dard. 37 This standard is intended to be indicative of what an unaffiliated party would pay
to purchase the asset in a true market.138
Unfortunately, the rules are disadvantageous because there often are no market com-
parables for such products. 39 Further, the value of intangibles can be difficult to ascer-
tain.140 It cannot be inferred from the costs incurred to create the products because they
are "high risk" items, meaning that they may achieve high values disproportionate to their
creation costs. 14 1 Additionally, their values can vary over time and in different use
environments.142
As such, $60 billion in annual U.S. revenue is likely lost to transfer pricing schemes.l 43
One-third of the repatriations under § 965 (described in Part II below) were related to
profits from intangibles within the pharmaceutical, and the computer and electronics in-
dustries.' 44 The current rules fail to reflect the dynamic aspects of mobile business trans-
129. See T-Pic1NG, supra note 125, at 11-17; Avi-Yonah, supra note 6, at 1591; Avramovich, supra note 125,
at 927-29; Benshalom, supra note 4, at 645-48; Drucker, supra note 122; Miller, supra note 4, at 9.
130. See T-PRICING, supra note 125, at 11-17; Avi-Yonah, supra note 6, at 1591; Avramovich, supra note 125,
at 927-29; Benshalom, supra note 4, at 645-48; Drucker, supra note 122; Miller, supra note 4, at 9.
131. See T-PRICING, supra note 125, at 11-17; Avi-Yonah, suvpa note 6, at 1591; Avramovich, supra note 125,
at 927-29; Benshalom, supra note 4, at 645-48; Drucker, supra note 122; Miller, supra note 4, at 9.
132. See T-PRct rNG, supra note 125, at 11-17; Avi-Yonah, supra note 6, at 1591; Avramovich, supra note 125,
at 927-29; Benshalom, supra note 4, at 645-48; Drucker, supra note 122; Miller, supra note 4, at 9.
133. Benshalom, supra note 4, at 633-41.
134. Id.
135. See T-PpiciNG, supra note 125, at 18-50 (describing U.S. law related to transfer pricing).
136. Benshalom, supra note 4, at 643-51.
137. Id. at 641-45. The IRS also allows other accounting methods for determining transfer price.
Avramovich, supra note 125, at 931-35. These methods include the comparable uncontrolled prices method,
the resale price method, the cost-plus method, the comparable profits method, the profit split method, and
unspecified methods. Id. The regulations do not specify a hierarchy among methods. Id. Rather, they re-
quire entities to use the "most reliable" method. Id. (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(c) (1994)).
138. Benshalom, supra note 4, at 641-45; Avramovich, supra note 125, at 930; Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b)(1)
(1994).




143. Miller, supra note 4, at 9.
144. Id.
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fers, the border defying economics required in valuing modem information assets, and the
true economics of multinational integrated entities. 145
ii. Allocation of Interest Expense
Because a U.S. parent and its CFC are distinct legal entities, the rules allow a U.S.
parent to borrow funds, thus incurring debt to contribute equity to its foreign subsidi-
ary. 146 The U.S. parent can deduct the interest paid in servicing the debt against its do-
mestic income taxes. 147 The subsidiary's foreign income, including that generated by the
borrowed funds, continues to benefit from deferral. 148 This is allocation of interest ex-
pense between a U.S. parent and its CFC for U.S. tax purposes. 149 These activities take
advantage of outdated entity and sourcing rules that do not reflect the integrated nature of
MNEs' earnings. Favorable MNE interest allocations likely account for the largest U.S.
revenue losses after transfer pricing.150
iii. Contract Manufacturing and Other Similar Arrangements
Contract manufacturing and similar arrangements, such as commissionaire agreements
in which a low-tax jurisdiction subsidiary earns commission for arranging sales of goods,
maneuver to shift income to related low-tax entities without triggering the Subpart F anti-
deferral rules.151 A CFC in a low-tax jurisdiction can enter into a contract manufacturing
agreement with a high-tax jurisdiction manufacturer. 152 The CFC can input "substantial
contributions" to the manufacturing process without generating income that will trigger
Subpart F.153 The CFC's contributions will trigger Subpart F if the CFC also has a
branch in the high-tax jurisdiction. 15 4 But substantial contributions, themselves, will not
constitute having a branch. 55 The CFC's non-Subpart F sales income resulting from
these arrangements will continue to enjoy deferral. 156
These rules are rooted in outdated place-of-business concepts. 157 They presume that
non-Subpart F income, or income entitled to deferral, is immobile and related to a single
jurisdiction.'58 But in reality non-Subpart F income is readily movable and multi-jurisdic-
tional.159 The rules are founded in ideas that relate singular physical presence and resi-
dency to national production, value creation, and income. 160 But, as the link between
taxpayer presence and economic activity erodes, attributing taxpayer income to a fiscal
145. See Benshalom, supra note 4, at 641-51 (highlighting the horizontally integrated operations of MNhEs).






152. Id. at 10-11.




157. Id. at 5.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. See Benshalom, supra note 4, at 641-51.
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jurisdiction under the current rules becomes less and less feasible.161 Moreover, "it is
rather unclear that the current sourcing conventions are apt for determining the fiscal
connection of many economic activities that have no clear physical presence ."162
These rules do not account for global income.
iv. Hybrid Instruments and Check-the-Box Elections
Hybrid instruments and check-the-box elections were .originally intended to designate
whether a firm was a corporation or a partnership for tax purposes when a U.S. corpora-
tion was doing business overseas. 163 They applied to foreign circumstances through the
"disregarded entity" rules, under which an entity might have been recognized as a separate
corporation in one nation but not in another.' 64 Corporations can now structure their
transactions to take advantage of these rules to avoid Subpart F, under which the income
would otherwise be taxable. 165 As stated above, Subpart F is designed to deny the deferral
of income structured to deprive the United States of revenue. 166 Check-the-box and hy-
brid instruments allow a CFC to simply elect to be disregarded for U.S. federal income tax
purposes while taking advantage of opposite entity treatment in foreign jurisdictions. 167
Other hybrid instruments avoid U.S. taxes by electing debt treatment in one jurisdiction
and equity treatment in another.168 Such elections blatantly conflict with Subpart F's
intentions.1 69
In addition to maximizing deferral by avoiding Subpart F through the above activities,
taxpayers may also take advantage of the highly prescriptive rules to structure their entities
to avoid the CFC rules entirely.17
B. THE PREscRiPrvE RULES ARE COMPLEX AND OUTDATED
The rules are outdated, 171 highly prescriptive, 172 and overly complex. 73 The interna-
tional provisions have not been seriously overhauled since Subpart F was enacted in
1962.174 The general corporate system has not been revisited since 1986.175
161. See id.
162. Id. at 634-35.
163. GSAVELLE, supra note 113, at 10-11.
164. Id.
165. Miller, supra note 4, at 10-11.
166. I.R.C. §§ 951-65; CFCs STUDY, supra note 95, at xi-xv, 22.
167. GRAVELLE, supra note 113, at 10-11.
168. Miller, supra note 4, at 11-12.
169. See GRAVELLE, supra note 113, at 7 (noting artificial profit shifting).
170. Miller, supra note 4, at 13. Taxpayers would also need to avoid the Passive Foreign Investment Com-
pany Rules, similarly enacted to deny deferral. Id.
171. Desai & Hines, supra note 1, at 937; Holmes, supra note 1, at 3.
172. Holmes, supra note 1, passim.
173. Id. at 10-15;JEC, supra note 3, passim.
174. Holmes, supra note 1, at 3.
175. Id.
VOL. 46, NO. 2
REHABILITATING U.S. CORPORATE INCOME TAX 723
As the business environment evolves and international business increases, taxpayer be-
haviors adapt.' 76 In reacting to taxpayers, legislators have added a staggering array of
piecemeal changes to the rules on top of the old framework 77 without modifying the
underlying architecture or synthesizing the regime.' 78 The American Bar Association rec-
ognizes the "accretion of tax rules without periodic thorough reviews of the needs of the
system" as a key reason for the system's resulting complexity.179 The rules contain incon-
sistencies, work at cross-purposes, lack coherence, and make it difficult for the United
States to achieve any ultimate policy goal.180
Additions to the rules tend to be prescriptive, literally identifying behaviors, and quali-
fying and quantifying their results, but failing to "govern by principle".'5 ' Prescriptive
rules issue precise instructions for specific factual situations without indicating why those
instructions are required. 8 2 Principles-based rules, on the other hand, expressly state the
principles underlying the rules. s3 For example, prescriptive rules issued in my home may
state that removing items from the refrigerator or using dishes after 9:00 p.m. is disal-
lowed. An individual in my home would be unable to discern the principle underlying
these rules, which is that once mom has cleaned up and done the dishes for the evening,
she does not want any messes in the kitchen. This example's prescriptions leave no room
for mom or others to respond reasonably to the underlying principle in adhering to or
enforcing the rule. What if mom works late and cannot get into the kitchen to make
dinner until after 9:00 p.m.? What if others in the household are willing and able to clean
up after themselves in the evening? Stating on the face of the rules the principles sought
to be applied can enable those whose activity is being regulated to respond appropriately
in a variety of situations.'8 4 Clarity can also engender greater respect for the rules them-
selves.' 85 Further, it allows regulators to enforce the rules consistently with their underly-
ing principles even in unpredictable circumstances. 86
For established and habitual fact patterns, however, prescriptive rules may be ideal for
bringing about consistently reasonable results.' 8 7 In regulating driving speeds, a prescrip-
tive rule would simply provide a precise speed limit. 8s A principles-based rule might state
that driving speeds must be safe within existing traffic and weather conditions. 18 9 In this
176. See Benshalom, supra note 4, at 633-40 (describing taxpayer behaviors and the eroding link between
fiscal jurisdiction and residency); Desai & Hines, supra note 1, at 938 (describing today's evolving markets and
global economies); Holmes, supra note 1, at 1, 3 (describing "highly elastic" multinational corporations).
177. Holmes, supra note 1, at 8-11.
178. See id. at 11.
179. American Bar Association, Report of the Task Force on International Tax Reform, 59 TAx LAW. 649, 687
(2006).
180. Holmes, supra note 1, at 12 (citing Robert J. Peroni et al., Reform and Simplification of the U.S. Foreign
Tax Credit Rules, 31 TAx NOTES INT'L 1177, 1181 (2003)).
181. Holmes, supra note 1, at 6-7, 48-49, 48 n.161 (citing Kevin Dolan, Foreign Tax Credit Generator Regs:
The Purple People Eater Returns, 47 TAx NOTES INT'L 251, 256 (2007)).
182. Holmes, supra note 1, at 6.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 21-23.
185. See id. at 21.
186. Id. at 1-11, 21-53.
187. Id. at 21-22.
188. Id. at 22.
189. Id.
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case, drivers would be left to determine for themselves which speeds were safe in what
conditions. 190
In corporate tax law, prescriptive rules are perfect for governing ordinary repeated ac-
tivities. 191 But the more sophisticated the transactions being regulated, the more dynamic
must be the rules regulating them. 192 Principles-based rules are dynamic. 93 Prescriptive
rules are not.' 94 They cannot reach evolving taxpayer behaviors or unknown situations. 95
The more complex the behaviors being addressed, the more extensive, convoluted, and
inadequate are the prescriptions that attempt to regulate them.196
In resorting to prescriptive rules, the government fails to state its underlying intentions
and the rules obscure congressional meaning. 9 7 For example, to relieve taxpayers of dual-
nation taxation, IRC § 901 and its associated regulations allow U.S. tax credit for foreign
taxes paid or deemed paid when the foreign payment is "compulsory." 98 But the rules
can be abused. 199 Recognizing this, the regulations enunciate criteria describing abusive
"structured passive investment arrangements" that constitute "noncompulsory" payments
not eligible for U.S. tax credit.200 As is common in the rules, the regulations fail to state
any underlying principle relative to disallowing excess foreign credits.20' They strictly
apply if six requirements are met.20 2 In response to the prescriptive provisions, business
entities are able to engage in transactions substantially identical to those proscribed with-
out triggering the regulations, and transactions not designed to avoid U.S. tax, but that do
meet the six criteria, are captured by and disallowed under the regulations. 20 3 If the gov-
ernment utilized principles-based rules here, it could apply its standards to disallow novel
violative transactions while allowing non-abusive exchanges. 20 4
In contrast, the passive-activity loss rules underwent just such a change when an exhaus-
tively prescriptive version of these standards was re-written as simpler and more princi-
ples-based. 205 The principles-based iteration of the rules more easily addresses varying
taxpayer behaviors.206 IRC § 469 and its accompanying regulations outline the U.S. tax
rules for income related to passive trade or business activities. 20 7 In an effort to eliminate
abusive passive activity loss transactions, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) initially pre-
scribed sixty pages of activities "tests" designed to cover every transactional scenario in
190. Id.
191. See id. at 26-27, 36-37, 40, 53 (describing the benefits of prescriptive rules in the Code).
192. Id. at 21-53.
193. Id. at 21-23.
194. Id.
195. See id. at 21-53 (describing principles-based versus prescriptive rules).
196. Id. passim.
197. Id. at 48-49.
198. Id. at 47.
199. Id. at 46-49.
200. Id. at 48.




205. Id. at 24-25.
206. Id.
207. Id.
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which a taxpayer could participate. 208 The regulations were highly criticized as too. long
and complex, 2 09 and were allowed to expire.210 In their place, the IRS put forth eight
pages of more principles-based regulations applicable to both known and unknown situa-
tions.211 Though simpler, these regulations are more dynamic and have been increasingly
successful at halting taxpayer abuse.212
The U.S. corporate tax system under-utilizes principles-based standards. 21 3 It is "domi-
nated by a complex array of bright-line prescriptive rules. 214 As our tax system has
grown, its prescriptive nature has not.2 1 5 The attempts of the Code and its related regula-
tions to address ever evolving international taxpayer behaviors and other sophisticated
transactional dynamics with narrow static prescriptions result in a code that has grown
from "complex to [] super-complex .... ,,216
The U.S. rules span nearly 100,000 pages of the Code and regulations. 217 They require
over 1,000 different taxpayer forms.21 They attempt to limit abuses by proscribing spe-
cific transactions "without stating why [those] transaction[s] [are] bad." 219 They assign
outcomes ex ante to anticipated factual situations.2 20 They fail to embrace elastic commer-
cial exchanges. 221 Their static attempts to address real world activity are always one or
more steps behind taxpayers. 222 Without real-time business relevance or harmony within
a unified system, the rules reflect a stale, unnecessarily complex, and "schizophren[ic]" 223
regime that must nonetheless be followed by all who seek to do business within the United
States.224
The rules are also challenging and costly to administer and to enforce.225 "[It can be
difficult, or nearly impossible, for the IRS to fully unravel the transactional web that is
woven in order to accurately decipher the true economics and intentions of the tax-








214. Id. at 6-7.
215. See id. passim (describing the Code).
216. Id. at 11.
217. Id. at 10.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 48 n.161 (citing Dolan, supra note 181, at 256).
220. Id. at 6.
221. Id. at 1-11, 21-53.
222. Id. at 11.
223. Id. at 12.
224. See JCT, supra note 7, at 20-21 (describing U.S. taxation); Holmes, supra note 1, at 1-15 (discussing the
complex regime).
225. Holmes, sipra note 1, at 13-14.
226. Id. at 14.
227. Id.
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C. THE RULES FAIL TO REFLECT THE GLOBAL TAX MARKET
The U.S. corporate income tax rules fail to acknowledge the world tax market. In to-
day's economy, international considerations are central to corporate planning and taxa-
tion. Not only has taxpayer behavior continued to evolve beyond the rules' prescriptions,
but taxes have grown from purely domestic concerns to global commodities. 2 8 No single
nation or pair of nations operating through a treaty can control the tax environment.229
Technological advances and relaxation of international exchange controls mean that busi-
nesses can increasingly elect to organize almost anywhere. 230 As such, tax incentives and
rates are subject to global competition.23' The U.S. system fails to respond to this reality.
As the U.S. corporate income tax rate has remained basically stagnant since the 1980s,
most other developed nations have lowered their corporate rates.232 The U.S. rate is now
one of the highest in the world. 233 U.S. taxation has consequently become an enormous
value burden for competing U.S. corporations. 234
Not only does the U.S. rate far exceed the rates of tax-haven nations, but it is out of line
with the rates of other developed nations competing in similar commercial industries.235
Additionally, complexity and datedness within the U.S. system combine with the overall
rate burden and other compliance costs to make the U.S. system something of a bear in
the world tax market.236 "[T]here has to be a reason that no other countries are in a hurry
to adopt rules anything like the U.S. rules ...."237 They are inefficient, administratively
challenging, costly with which to comply, enormously complex, often inequitable, and a
ridiculous value drain on both the United States and its taxpayers. 238 No one looks for-
ward to dealing with the U.S. regime.2 39 In fact, companies around the world would
prefer to avoid the U.S. rules altogether. 240 U.S. MNEs continue to benefit from U.S.
advancements and buyer and marketplace sophistication, but are pulled to organize for-
eign entities offshore to maximize value.241 The United States cannot deny the reality of
228. See Desai & Hines, supra note 1, at 937 (describing the new global reality of taxation); Shaviro, supra
note 4, at 377-80 (discussing the ability of global entities to elect domestic or foreign incorporation on the
basis of tax considerations).
229. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 6, at 1575-86 (describing global tax competition).
230. See id. at 1575 (discussing "international tax competition" and the "increased mobility of capital"); see
also Shaviro, supra note 4, passim (writing on "The Rising Tax-Electivity of U.S. Corporate Residence").
231. SeeAvi-Yonah, spra note 6, at 1576 (noting investors' abilities to invest in any of the world's major
economies).
232. See Carroll, supra note 12, at 5 (comparing international corporate income tax rates over time).
233. Id.
234. See JEC, supra note 3, at 1-4 (discussing the competitive burden that U.S. taxation places on U.S.
entities).
235. See Carroll, supra note 12, at 5 (charting international income tax rates).
236. See JEC, supra note 3, at 1-4 (discussing the burden posed by the U.S. system).
237. Holmes, supra note 1, at 12 (citingJames Hines, Remarks at Secretary HenryM. Paulson's Conference
on U.S. Business Tax Competitiveness aJuly 26, 2007)).
238. See Holmes, supra note 1, at 9-15 (describing complexity and other pitfalls within the U.S. corporate
income tax system).
239. See, e.g., id. (discussing domestic and international hesitancy to deal with the U.S. tax system); JCT,
supra note 7, passim (describing the effects of waning international willingness to succumb to U.S. taxation).
240. See, e.g., Holmes, supra note 1, at 9-15; JCT, supra note 7.
241. See Shaviro, supra note 4, at 377-80 (discussing rising corporate electivity and the draw of foreign over
U.S. incorporation).
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this world tax climate, or the low international position of the U.S. rate and overall
system. 242
D. THE REGIME FAILS TO SuSTAIN THE CAPITAL TAX BASE
There is a further problem with the state of the Code in its relation to international
business. It fails to sustain the U.S. capital tax base. 243 Capital is more mobile than labor,
especially now that capital assets are often not physical, but are financials or intangibles
that can cross borders electronically.244 As capital moves offshore, MNIEs are able to de-
rive most of their income abroad, free of U.S. taxation.245
Because much of what would arguably constitute U.S. capital (if there were no deferral)
escapes the U.S. income tax, the tax increasingly becomes a tax on those left behind in the
United States to carry the burden. 246 This largely means that the U.S. labor force is left
to fulfill the nation's tax demands. 247 The distributional bases underlying the income tax
have become skewed by this reality.248 Rather than taxing capital where it accumulates,
the government is left to draw primarily upon the income of those who remain behind in
State. 249
This is fundamentally at odds with trickle-down economics. Free market capitalism
presumes that as capital accumulates at the top of the market pyramid, the benefit of those
assets will flow downward to serve the general welfare.250 In this case, however, some of
the largest accumulations of capital assets have flown the home State to avoid tax contri-
butions.251 Thus, the capital tax base erodes, and labor must support the nation. 252 More-
over, this overseas capital continues to benefit from home-State association through non-
tax advantages, including the rule of law and government supports made possible by labor
force taxation. 253
No capitalist who believes in free-market capitalism could legitimately invite this back-
ward paradigm. Thus, as the old rules are carried forward and applied in today's business
context, they allow an economic result that is fundamentally at odds with the model they
purport. Addressing the rules in their capacity to create an economic model of wealth
distribution that reflects today's realities becomes more important than ever.
242. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 6, at 1575-86 (describing the dangers of global tax competition).
243. See id. passim (describing causes of, and issues related to, capital tax base erosion).
244. Id. at 1575.
245. Id. at 1577; see Annalyn Censky, GE: 7,000 Tax Returns, $0 US. Tax Bill, CNN MONEY, (Apr. 16, 2010),
http://money.cnn.com/2010/04/16/news/companies/ge-7000tax-reurnms (providing data on GE's earnings
and taxes paid on and offshore). GE earned $10.8 billion in foreign profits, but calculated losses in the
United States. Id. The company paid nothing to the U.S. federal government, instead receiving $1.1 billion
back from the United States as a result of its reported deductions and adjustments. Id.
246. Avi-Yonah, supra note 6, at 1577.
247. Id.
248. Shaviro, supra note 4, at 402.
249. Avi-Yonah,supra note 6, at 1577.
250. See ADAM SirTH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONs 362-63, 367 (Edwin Carman ed., Modern Library 1994)
(1776) (describing the accumulation of capital and the value of its "produce," which support productive and
unproductive labor and the nation's inhabitants).
251. Avi-Yonah, supra note 6, at 1577.
252. Id. at 1575-86.
253. Id. at 1575-77.
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E. THE RULES ENCOURAGE DEBT OVER EQUITY
The corporate tax rules encourage debt over equity by taxing equity while allowing
deductions on debt.2 5 4 As a result, U.S. entities have issued substantial amounts of debt to
maximize accounting value. 255 If Niall Ferguson is right, excessive debt is the key to this
economic crisis, and no amount of demand or added liquidity can correct it.256 There is
"no amount of money that can be created to restore the lost imaginary paper wealth." 257
In a debt overhang, as Ferguson describes, there is a point at which as a result of inordi-
nate debt the imaginary paper wealth just spins out of control.258 We can no longer keep
track of or maintain the ledgers, and the only answer is to write down, or forgive, the
debt.25 9 If this is so, we must take the corporate tax system's built-in debt preference
seriously.
We must address the reality that we distort corporate investment financing decisions.2 60
According to the Congressional Research Service, the current favorable treatment of debt
over equity makes the effective tax rate on debt 20 percent compared to a 48 percent
effective rate on equity.261 In this way, the U.S. corporate tax contributes to instability in
economic downturns and must be corrected. 262
F. THE U.S. CORPORATE INCOME TAX RATE is Too HIGH INTERNATIONALLY
The overall corporate tax rate in the United States is much too high. 263 As described
above, the current rate burdens the U.S. economy. Tax rates and tax systems are subject
to global competition, including competition from tax haven nations. 264 Rates around the
world provide greater national investment returns than does the U.S. rate,265 drawing
U.S. and global business away from the United States and causing concern for the U.S.
future. 266
254. L'.TEGRATION, spra note 9, at 39.
255. Id. at vii-viii.
256. Niall Ferguson, The Age of Obligation, FIN. TIMES, (Dec. 19, 2008), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/
85432b32-cd32-1 ldd-9905-000077b07658.html#axzzlf3w5jh4x.
257. Martin A. Sullivan & Lee A. Sheppard, Repatriation Aid for the Financial Crisis?, 53 TAx NOTES INT'L
275, 276 (2009).
258. Ferguson, supra note 256.
259. Sullivan & Sheppard, Repatriation Aid, supra note 257, at 276; Ferguson, supra note 256. In contrast,
the Federal Reserve has approached the crisis with a monetaristic view by attempting to inject liquidity into
the system, while the Treasury Department has attempted to increase demand.
260. INrEGRsATION, supra note 9, at vii.
261. Id. at 6.
262. Id. at vii.
263. Shaviro, supra note 4, at 377-78; Carroll, supra note 12, passim; Holmes spra note 1, at 15-17.
264. SeeJCT, supra note 7, passim (discussing international tax competition and concerns regarding the U.S.
position); OECD REPORr, supra note 14, passim (describing the effects of harmful tax competition).
265. See Carroll, supra note 12, at 5 (highlighting international income tax rates).
266. SeeJCT, svpra note 7, at 2-19.
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The top U.S. corporate income tax rate is 35%.267 The combined federal-state rate is
39.2%.268 Among OECD countries, only Japan has a higher combined rate. 269 Theirs is
0.3% higher than ours, at 39.5%.270 The U.S. combined rate runs from five to twenty
percentage points higher than all other OECD country combined rates, apart from Ire-
land 271 (Ireland, considered a tax haven nation, has the lowest OECD country combined
rate at 12.5%).272
In the 1980s, the United States' overall corporate tax rate was relatively low interna-
tionally.2 73 Since then, corporate tax rates for OECD nations other than the United
States have fallen, while the U.S. rate has remained largely unchanged. 274 In 1988, the
U.S. rate was 11.89 points below the average G-7 country rate.275 In 1993, it was 5.36
points below the G-7 average. 276 In 2009, it was 5.44 points higher than the G-7 average
rate.277 Today it is one of the highest.278 Further, the U.S. rate must remain "uncompeti-
tively high" under today's rules 279 to accommodate the (at least) forty percent of earnings
that U.S. corporations are likely to hold out of reach in offshore deferral.280 A rate cor-
rection alone cannot repair the regime's failings, but is absolutely necessary and must be
instituted within a system-wide overhaul.
111. 26 U.S.C. § 965 of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004
Section 965281 was enacted as part of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (the
Act).282 It enabled the U.S. parent shareholder of a CFC to repatriate income to the
United States at sharply reduced tax rates.283 The United States wanted the influx of
capital and revenue to spur job growth, and regulated the repatriations accordingly. 284
Companies returning funds under the law were required to do so according to "domestic
reinvestment plans" 285 (DRIPs) 286 which allowed the funds to be used only for ap-
267. I.R.C. § 11.
268. OECD Tax Database, Corporate and Capital Income Taxes, OECD.oRG, http://www.oecd.org/document
60/0,3746,en_2649_34533_1942460_lljl1,00.html#C_CorporateCaptial (click "Corporate and Capital
Income Taxes," then click "Basic (non-targeted) corporate income tax rates" hyperlink).
269. See id. (displaying 2011 OECD nation corporate income tax rates).
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id. (the U.S. combined rate is 26.7 points higher than that of Ireland).
273. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, CORPORATE INCOME TAx RATES: INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS 15
(2005) (outlining historical international tax rates).
274. Carroll, upra note 12, at 5 (in 1986, the top U.S. corporate rate was 34 percent. In 1993, this rate was




278. Id. at 1, 5.
279. Durst, supra note 4, at 314.
280. Desai & Hines, supra note 1, at 939.
281. I.R.C. § 965.
282. American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
283. I.R.C. § 965 (2012); Boise, supra note 4, at 669.
284. I.R.C. § 965(b)(4)(A)-(B); see Boise, supra note 4, at 692 (describing "'domestic reinvestment plans'
('DRIP's)" and their approval requirements).
285. I.R.C. § 965(b)(4).
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proved 287 reinvestment 28 8 purposes.28 9  But DRIPs were unenforceable. 290  Because
money is fungible, MNEs were able to shuffle earnings around, technically complying
with the letter of the law regarding their DRIPs, but actually using repatriated funds for
prohibited uses such as share repurchases. 29 1 Many actually laid off employees rather than
create jobs. 292
By way of dividends received from their CFCs, U.S. parent corporations were allowed
to return to the United States earnings they would otherwise have indefinitely retained
offshore.29 3 These dividends were allowed an 85 percent income tax rate deduction. 29 4 In
effect, U.S. parents were able to repatriate dividend earnings from CFCs at an income tax
rate of 5.25 percent. 29
5
Our tax rate generally serves as a disincentive for U.S. MINEs to repatriate dividends.
296
Yet in 2005 when § 965 became effective, there proved sufficient non-tax incentives297 for
U.S. NNEs to repatriate at the lowered rate. 298 The reduced tax generated $362 billion
in income.29 9 $315 billion qualified for the deduction, resulting in $16.5 billion in U.S.
tax revenue.
300
Eight-hundred-thirty-two multinationals chose to repatriate under the Act.
30 1 Of
those, a group of forty of the largest U.S. MINEs generated 44 percent of the total repatri-
ated earnings, or about $184.8 billion. 30 2 Total earnings and profits for all CFCs in 2005
were $804 billion. 30 3 To put this in perspective, the entire corporate tax generates only
about $370 billion in annual revenue. 30 4 Foreign-source deferred earnings thus represent
a relatively enormous well of untapped potential U.S. capital. Even the portion of revenue
voluntarily repatriated at the reduced rate under the current regime represents an approxi-
mate additional 4.5% of the total corporate income tax.
30 5
286. Boise, supra note 4, at 692.
287. I.R.C. § 965(b)(4)(A).
288. Id. § 965(b)(4)(B).
289. Id. These purposes included "the funding of worker hiring and training, infrastructure, research and
development, capital investments, or the financial stabilization of the corporation for the purposes of job
retention or creation." Id. Section 965 specifically excluded using the funds as payment for executive com-
pensation. Id.
290. Sullivan & Sheppard, Repatriation Aid, supra note 257, at 281.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Boise, supra note 4, at 690-91.
294. I.R.C. § 965(a)(1).
295. Boise, supra note 4, at 690.
296. Holmes, supra note 1, at 15-20.
297. Shaviro, supra note 4, at 379 (presenting the notion of tax versus non-tax reasons to incorporate within
or without the United States).
298. See Sullivan & Sheppard, Repatriation Aid, supra note 257, at 278 (outlining the repatriation that oc-
curred because of § 965).
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Lee A. Sheppard & Martin A. Sullivan, Multinationals Accumulate to Repatriate, 53 TAx NOTES INT'L
376, 376 (2009).
302. Id. at 377.
303. Sullivan & Sheppard, Repatriation Aid, supra note 257, at 278.
304. Durst, supra note 4, at 315.
305. 4.46 percent of 370,000,000,000 = 16,502,000,000.
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The deduction represented a one-time repatriation tax "holiday." 306 It applied only to
certain earnings over a specified base period.30 7 Total amounts that could be deducted
were limited to "the greater of (1) $500 million, and (2) the amount of earnings shown on
the U.S. shareholder's 'applicable financial statement' as 'permanently reinvested outside
the [United States]."308
Section 965's success was in shining a light on the enormous untaxed capital wealth held
offshore by U.S. CFCs. It made clear that some of the United States' most profitable
companies are its NINEs, and that if handled properly, cross-border business incomes can
account for a large portion of U.S. income tax revenue. This same income could addition-
ally benefit the U.S. capital market.309
Importantly, § 965 also demonstrated that a lowered tax rate could swing the balance in
terms of tax and non-tax incentives to repatriate foreign earnings to the United States. In
other words, though the U.S. corporate tax system and the high overall rate force U.S.
MNEs to move and hold earnings abroad, U.S. parent companies would like to repatriate
their CFCs' foreign earnings. There is a tax rate at which the disincentive to repatriate
dissipates, and after tracking the repatriations spurred by § 965, we see that this rate can
be higher than zero. This means that the United States still has plenty to offer in terms of
a viable business environment, and can compete with tax havens on its own terms without
instituting a territorial system or completely exempting foreign earnings from income tax.
With a healthy Code and related regulations, the U.S. economy can benefit from, and
earn revenue on, repatriated foreign-source earnings while still supporting MNE compet-
itiveness. To constructively address U.S. foreign-source income, the United States should
end deferral and re-work its international provisions, its income tax rate, and the corpo-
rate tax system as a whole.
IV. Recommendations
Although the results of § 965's deferral experiment were enlightening, the rate holiday
should not be repeated. Repetition would only enforce deferrals, 310 and encourage off-
shore earnings accumulations. 31' Additionally, the United States should not address the
issues highlighted by § 965 and current business practice by instituting piecemeal correc-
tions for isolated problems. 312 The Code is outdated, 313 overly complex, 314 largely irrele-
306. See Dhammika Dharmapala, C. Fritz Foley & Kristin J. Forbes, Watch What I Do, Not What I Say: The
Unintended Consequences of the Homeland InvestmentAct, at 1 (2010) (describing Section 965 as a tax holiday);
Boise, supra note 4, at 692 (explaining that Congress intended the provision to be a "one-time affair").
307. Boise, supra note 4, at 690.
308. Id. at 691.
309. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 6, at 1585-86 (discussing cross-border capital flows and their relationship to
income taxation).
310. Sullivan & Sheppard, Repatriation Aid, supra note 257, at 285.
311. See Sheppard & Sullivan, Multinationals Accumulate, supra note 301, passim (explaining that multinationals
are encouraged to accumulate income offshore in expectation of repeated repatriation holidays). As a result of
this expectation, by the end of 2007 a group of forty multinationals had already accumulated $518 billion
offshore. Id. These funds were deliberately placed overseas in anticipation of reduced taxation. Id. Mean-
while, these placements deprive the United States of capital income and tax revenue. Id.
312. See Holmes, supra note 1, at 5-7 (discussing the detriments of such an approach in the current system).
313. Desai & Hines, supra note 1,passim.
314. JEC, supra note 3.
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vant to current scenarios, 315 and ineffective as a whole. 316 It must be addressed and
reconstructed from its foundational concepts to its rates and rules.
A. CREATE NEW E-rrry DEFiNITIONS AND SOURCE RULES
With global business, mobile intangible assets, and horizontally integrated MiNEs,
value is generated by multiple entities in various jurisdictions.3 17 The IRC entity and
source provisions fail to reflect this. 3 1s I therefore recommend that the United States
create new entity definitions and source rules to reach mobile, multi-jurisdictional, and
seemingly jurisdiction-less international income and to close the gaps that allow deferral.
Under the IRC, a U.S. corporation is simply one that incorporates in the United States,
while a foreign corporation does not.3 19 These rules are anchored by immobile business
notions that no longer apply.320 Now that the U.S. owners of an MNE can benefit from
U.S. laws and technology while sitting at a U.S. computer organizing foreign entities and
exercising asset and management transfers to CFCs, these definitions fall short.
32 1 Simi-
larly irrelevant are the U.S. transaction and sourcing rules, which allow potential U.S.
related income to escape the Code and its related regulations.
322
I do not advocate control and management-centered entity definitions.323 Because U.S.
MiNEs' resources are so vast, it would be too easy for an MINE to simply work around
such static rules by transferring control and management offshore. 324 I do recommend
that the definitions of U.S. and foreign corporations, and the sourcing rules, take into
account the dynamic nature of MNEs and their income. Their value-generating opera-
tions are integrated and essentially borderless. 32 MiNEs and their transactions should be
recognized in a way that reflects this modern and evolving reality. The United States
should re-define U.S. entities and source rules to capture all U.S. related value, including
foreign and border-defying income.
315. Desai & Hines, s-upra note 1, passim.
316. Durst, supra note 4, at 314.
317. Benshalom, supra note 4, at 638-45.
318. See I.R.C. § 7701(a)(4)-(a)(5) (defining a foreign corporation as one that is not "created or organized in
the United States or under the law of the United States or of any State .
319. Id.
320. See Benshalom, supra note 4, at 638-40 (explaining that today's cross-border businesses exploit tradi-
tional notions of legal ownership and fiscal tax jurisdiction); Holmes, supra note 1, at 17 (stating that "sophis-
ticated MNCs have become more elastic" and unrestricted by geographic location, and that they are able to
easily move resources and profits from burdensome to optimal jurisdictions); Miller, supra note 4, at 5 (stating
that while non-Subpart F income entitled to deferral "was intended to represent immobile income .. .U.S.
taxpayers are readily able to move non-Subpart F income to low-income jurisdictions and achieve deferral").
321. See Benshalom, supra note 4, at 638-40; Holmes, supra note 1, at 17; Miller, supra note 4, at 5.
322. See Benshalom, supra note 4, passim (writing about the inadequacies of the sourcing rules).
323. See Boise, supra note 4, at 676 (suggesting that the United States may alter the definition of a foreign
corporation to reflect the corporation's place of management and control).
324. See Benshalom, supra note 4, at 645-648 (describing MNEs vast resources and abilities to re-distribute
risks and benefits across multiple entities in various jurisdictions).
325. Id.
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B. STRENGTHEN THE WORLDWIDE INCOME TAX SYSTEM
A worldwide income tax system is appropriate for embracing the reality of evolving
global transactions. 326 I recommend that the United States strengthen its worldwide sys-
tem to embrace current and future business. MNEs are some of the largest earners in the
U.S. tax structure. 327 They require an income tax context that moves around and over
borders with them, their transactions, and their income. 32 s
A territorial system that inherently ends at U.S. national boundaries is inadequate to
encompass cross-border transactions.329 A territorial system is unsuitable for relating tax-
ation to future global enterprise.330 Business entities are free to roam.33' Lest the United
States find itself without strong capital resources, it must find ways to tax capital income
that benefits from the home jurisdiction while, under current rules, calculating income
outside of it.
Only a worldwide system provides a reasonable context for global exchanges and mobile
capital assets, as well as for horizontally integrated entities whose value generations make
minced meat of historical land-based legal partitions. Because cross-border transactions
are only increasing, 332 international concepts and a worldwide platform must carry the
U.S. corporate income tax.
C. ADD PRINCIPLES-BASED STANDARDS
One of the most detrimental aspects of the rules is that they are largely prescriptive,
outlining precise behaviors, cataloguing outcomes, and encouraging abusive avoidance. 333
I recommend utilizing principles-based rules, per Rachelle Holmes, for simplification and
dynamism. 334 Principles-based rules would explicitly state on the face of the rules their
underlying principles.33s In contrast, prescriptive rules prescribe outcomes for narrowly
anticipated factual situations without necessarily communicating the principles being ap-
plied.336 To an extent, this is necessary in a tax code. 337 But the prescriptive nature of the
rules allows taxpayers to continually restructure and reclassify activities to remain steps
ahead of the Code. 338 In fact, companies are often years ahead of the IRS in structuring
326. Carroll, supra note 12, at 1-5; see Desai & Hines, supra note 1, at 938-39 (writing about the "The Rising
Importance of Foreign Income." A territorial system does not tax foreign income).
327. See Shaviro, supra note 4, at 380 (noting that ". .. U.S. multinationals have more than $10 trillion
invested abroad, including at least $1 trillion of foreign earnings").
328. See Benshalom, supra note 4, at 634-50 (describing the border-defying world of MINE activity).
329. See Carroll, supra note 12, at 2, 4-5 (describing the workings of territorial tax systems).
330. Id.; see Desai & Hines, supra note 1, at 938-39 (describing "The Rising Importance of Foreign
Income").
331. See Shaviro, supra note 4, at 377-80 (discussing the rising electivity of corporate incorporation).
332. Id.; see Desai & Hines, supra note 1, at 938-39 (describing "The Rising Importance of Foreign
Income").
333. See Holmes, supra note 1, passim.
334. See supra note 2.
335. Holmes, supra note 1, at 6.
336. Id.
337. See id. at 26-27, 36-37, 40, 53 (describing the advantages of utilizing prescriptive provisions in the Tax
Code).
338. See id. at 13-15, 50-51 (highlighting MINE preference for complex prescriptive rules that allow them to
exploit loopholes and circumvent provisions).
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transactions. 339 By the time the Code catches up to business trends, corporations have
moved on, and even new provisions lack real-time relevance.3 4
The U.S. corporate tax system is riddled with complex prescriptions.3 41 "Not only is
the sheer volume of these rules staggering, but they often lack coherence, are both over-
and under-inclusive, and fail to adequately adjust to evolving financial transactions." 342
U.S. taxpayers spend hundreds of billions of dollars each year to comply with the rules and
to exploit their prescriptive weaknesses.3 43 Prescriptive rules added to the Code to address
violations after they are discovered are inadequate to control future tax avoidance. 344
Principles-based rules would express standards that convey the policies driving the
rules. 345 This would simplify the rules while also making them relevant to numerous situ-
ations.346 Principles-based rules would be highly appropriate to supplement, and often to
replace, prescriptive rules in U.S. corporate tax law. 347 They should be utilized in a re-
vamped code.
Prescriptive rules should continue to govern commonplace transactions.3 48 They can
provide certain tax costs wherever the provisions adequately address unchanging or rela-
tively standard activities, especially where longstanding rules and regulations clearly work
well. 349 Where taxpayer behaviors or the business environment are evolving, as is the case
relative to international transactions, principles-based rules should be used for simplicity
and an elastic embrace of wide ranging scenarios.350
New rules should expressly state the principles that rule makers seek to apply.35 1 In
conjunction, limited revenue rulings should provide "targeted guidance" to taxpayers and
administrators, while still allowing overarching principles to govern unspecified and un-
foreseen facts.352 Using principles-based rules should help to greatly-simplify the Code
and its related regulations, close loopholes, decrease compliance and enforcement costs,
and support a reduction in the overall corporate tax rate. 353
339. Id. at 14 (explaining tax administrators' difficulties in unraveling transactions because transactions can
"have extraneous pieces that are included solely to befuddle auditors") (quoting David M. Schizer, Enlisting
the Tax Bar, 59 TAx L. Rlv. 331, 335 (2006)); see id. at 25-30 & n.46 (describing the rapid pace of global
transactional innovations relative to taxation).
340. See Holmes, supra note 1, passim (discussing the prescriptive rules' relationship to elastic MNE activity).
341. Id. at 7.
342. Id.
343. See IR-2009-3, National Taxpayer Advocate Urges Tax Simplification and Compassionate Treatment of Tax-
payers Hit by Recession (Jan. 7, 2009), http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=202260,00.html [hereinafter
Taxpayer Advocate] (reporting that U.S. taxpayers spend $193 billion in compliance annually).
344. See Holmes, supra note 1, passim (outlining the drawbacks of prescriptive rules).
345. Id. passim.
346. Id.
347. Id. at 26-27, 36-37, 40, 53.
348. Id. at 26-27.
349. Id.
350. Id. at 27-28.
351. Id. at 6.
352. Id. at 30-31.
353. Id. passim.
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D. END DEFERRAL
Deferral is an enormous revenue drain for the United States in today's international
business environment. 35 4 I recommend that the United States end deferral. As described
above, deferral causes a massive well of potential U.S. foreign-source income that sits just
out of reach offshore. Once U.S. corporations and transactions are appropriately charac-
terized, the United States should end deferral to capture U.S. foreign-source income for
revenue purposes.
E. REDUCE THE TAX RATE
As an important part of these recommendations, I propose a reduced overall corporate
tax rate at or below 10 percent. 35" These recommendations would end deferral and signif-
icantly broaden the U.S. tax base. Along with clearer and more simplified rules, improved
ease within the system, and the resulting reduced compliance costs, these changes should
facilitate a reduced overall corporate tax rate. 356 A reduced rate would help to make the
United States competitive in the world tax market and a desirable investment and incorpo-
ration site.
I do not recommend a zero percent tax rate for foreign-source income. One of my
primary considerations in making these recommendations is the United States' need for
revenue. A zero percent rate would not address this need. Further, a zero percent rate
would defeat the purpose described in these recommendations of ending deferral and cap-
turing U.S. related international income with new entity definitions and source rules.
Why capture revenue if you are not going to tax it? Additionally, as a result of § 965, we
see that a zero percent foreign-source income tax rate is not necessary to draw U.S. invest-
ment.35 7 But it is realistic to note that exempting MNE foreign-source income from U.S.
taxation appears to be on the table when it comes to contemplating Code revisions. 358
It is important to take this alternative seriously. The way things are going, so much
U.S. entity income is overseas (a minimum of forty percent and growing),3s9 and tax
avoidance measures are so pervasive that the effective foreign-source income tax rate is
already nearing zero percent. 360 Explicitly exempting active foreign-source income would
354. Miller, supra note 4, at 7; Shaviro, supra note 4, at 380.
355. There is a rate that registers to the taxpayer as reasonable, rather than as an unjust transfer of wealth.
The corporate rate should hover just below a rate that the corporation perceives as unreasonable. In part, I
call for this 10 percent rate in an attempt to express reasonableness. But it is possible that U.S. companies are
actually comfortable with a higher rate. If so, the tax rate should be set there. A reasonable rate should be
determined, at least in part, by the ratio of income that U.S. companies are currently willing to invest in U.S.
taxes, including planning, avoidance, and compliance costs. With a greatly simplified system, nearly that
entire amount should funnel directly into tax payments.
356. See infra notes 363-65 (noting rate reductions facilitated by other systemic corrections).
357. See supra Part m.
358. SeeJEC, supra note 3, at 11 (discussing exempting foreign source income); Carroll, nspra note 12, at 1-5
(considering exempting active foreign source income from U.S. tax).
359. Desai & Hines, supra note 1, at 939.
360. See Drucker, supra note 122 (reporting that "U.S. companies are sitting on at least $1.375 trillion" in
foreign subsidiary earnings on which they pay no federal income taxes). Google alone saves roughly $1
billion in U.S. taxes annually by allocating certain profits to a subsidiary in Bermuda, from which it owes no
U.S. income tax. Id. This subsidiary collected approximately $6.1 billion in royalties in 2009. Id. As of June
30, 2011, Google held $18.8 billion in cash in its foreign subsidiaries. Id.
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only intensify the concerning results that our current system engenders. On the other
hand, it may be the case that a tax on foreign income at a rate above zero percent would
allow a domestic rate reduction.
In calculating a new rate, I begin by considering reductions ostensibly made possible by
these recommendations severally. According to the U.S. Treasury Department, the CBIT
integration prototype highlighted below would facilitate a revenue-neutral rate reduction
of three percent (without instituting changes that greatly alter the effects of the current
international provisions).361 Ending deferral would likely support at least a 1.5% revenue-
neutral rate reduction.362 Other changes proposed here may further support reductions in
the current rate.36 3 Additively, these changes should facilitate an overall rate reduction
below 30.5 percent, with a lower potential boundary of 23.5%.364 But the CBIT and
deferral-ending reduction calculations were apparently each made by considering particu-
lar changes within our current tax regime. 365 It is difficult to assess the quantitative tax
rate effect that a wholly re-envisioned tax structure may facilitate.
In addition to the hundreds of billions of dollars that U.S. entities spend annually on tax
planning and compliance,366 the rules themselves currently contain hidden annual compli-
ance costs of at least $260 billion. 367 This should change with simplified rules. Losses and
costs associated with U.S. MNE deferral abuses should lessen, be minimized, or be elimi-
nated under these proposed changes. The loss of U.S. capital income that results under
the current rules would also likely change as a result of these recommendations. Of
course, there will be costs associated with restructuring the system and creating and im-
plementing new rules 368 I have not begun to calculate those costs here.
Based on AvINE sensitivity to the tax environment, it is difficult to predict corporate
response to these changes. But it is possible to imagine that simplified rules, minimized
compliance costs, and a lowered rate would be welcome. Logic dictates that making the
rules easier to work with, and to account for at the bottom line, would benefit MINEs.
361. INTEGRATION, supra note, 9 at 39.
362. Miller, supra note 4, at 7.
363. See Durst, supra note 4, at 315 (stating that correcting the dysfunctional aspects of the rules would likely
allow a rate reduction of seven percentage points); Holmes, supra note 1, at 50 (stating that using principles-
based rules within the tax system would likely allow the United States to lower its statutory corporate tax
rate). Additionally, new entity definitions and source rules would likely generate increased revenue, which
may further allow the United States to reduce the overall rate.
364. The current overall corporate income tax rate is 35%. I.R.C. § 11. A 3% reduction from CBIT
changes, INTEGRATION, supra note 9, at 39, plus an additional 1.5% from ending deferral, Miller, supra note
4, at 7, would result in a 4.5% reduction (35% - 4.5% = 30.5%). Adding Durst's seven-percentage-point
reduction, Durst, supra note 4, at 315, lowers the overall rate to 23.5% (35% - 4.5% - 7% = 23.5%). It is not
clear whether Durst's calculations would overlap the others, or if he considered integration. If Durst consid-
ered ending deferral, but not integration, we might calculate a rate reduction of ten percentage points
(Durst's seven points plus three points for CBIT integration) amounting to an overall rate of 25% (35% - 3%
- 7% = 25%).
365. See INTEGRATION, spra note 9, at 39-60; Miller, supra note 4, at 7 (each analyzing changes within the
overall current regime).
366. See Taxpayer Advocate, supra note 343 (indicating that U.S. taxpayers spend $193 billion annually in
planning and compliance).
367. Holmes, supra note 1, at 13.
368. See, e.g., INTEGRATION, supra note 9, at viii (including costs associated with shifting certain aspects of
the current tax structure). The CBIT purports to pay for itself. Id.
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Additionally, improving returns for U.S., as opposed to foreign, incorporation and invest-
ment would likely attract business to the United States.
Overall, because of these recommendations, I would like to see the United States cap-
ture revenue from a greatly broadened capital tax base, including all U.S. related foreign-
source income, to spread the tax burden far and wide. Fundamentally, the overall rate
should be low enough, and the rules strong enough, that U.S. taxes are not worth abusing.
I would therefore implement a ten percent or lower rate for foreign and domestic income
alike, for equity purposes and to reduce the burden on individual entities. 369 I recommend
this rate to relieve the base while still allowing the United States to draw revenue from
across the full income spectrum. U.S. entities should retain greater value while the
United States benefits from taxing a much broader income base, including that of the
growing international capital asset market.370 As previously described, this is preferable to
continuing along our current path.
The non-tax incentives to invest and incorporate in the United States should augment
these changes. The new rate should revitalize the United States as an international busi-
ness and investment hub. This lowered rate should help to restore the United States as a
global business leader.
Significantly, under these recommendations, this lowered rate would be instituted not
as an isolated or harmful response to global tax competition. 371 This system-wide reduc-
tion would be a crucial and a healthy aspect of a fully overhauled regime. It would be
justified by other structural changes that together support efficiency, transparency, and
cooperative international principles.372 These changes would continue to uphold the
OECD's recommendations for "counteracting harmful tax competition." 373
F. INTEGRATE THE CORPORATE AND INDVIDUAL TAX SYSTEMS As DESCRIBED BY
THE CBIT PROTOTYPE
I recommend integrating the corporate and individual tax systems according to the
Comprehensive Business Income Tax (CBIT) prototype put forth by the Treasury Depart-
ment in its report entitled Integration of the Individual and Corporate Tax Systems: Tax-
ing Business Income Once. 374 In conjunction with the other recommendations in this
paper, the CBIT would positively serve corporate income tax reconstruction. 375
One of the effects of integrating the corporate and individual income tax systems would
be elimination of the double taxation of corporations and their shareholders. 376 These
parties represent separate legal persons that are currently each taxed on the same income
369. See supra note 355.
370. Id.; see Desai & Hines, supra note 1, at 938-39 (describing "The Rising Importance of Foreign
Income").
371. See OECD REPORT, supra note 14, passim (describing harmful taxation).
372. See id. (outlining measures for counteracting harmful tax competition). Factors including efficiency,
transparency, and international cooperation support healthy taxation. Id. at 40-55.
373. Id. passim.
374. INTrEGRATION, supra note 9, at 39-60.
375. Id.
376. See INTEGRATION, supra note 9, at 1 (explaining the two levels of income tax currently imposed on
corporate equity investments). This is distinguishable from two national governments each taxing the same
income. That is a different definition of a double tax.
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as it moves through their accounts. 377 To explain double taxation in every day terms,
consider an individual who gets paid at the end of the week. She brings her earnings to
the store on the comer where she gives the shop owner her money in exchange for the
items she buys. The shop owner puts the money in the register. Later, the shop owner
pays her employee with the money from the register. All three parties are taxed on in-
come from the same pile of money moving through their accounts.
In the United States, in conjunction with our decision to assign corporations separate
legal person status, we also tax them separately from their shareholders for income tax
purposes.3 78 We do this even when the individuals behind the corporate and shareholder
accounts are the same natural people. 379 We tax the corporation on its income. 380 Then,
when the corporation distributes a dividend out of that income to its shareholder, we tax
the shareholder on that dividend.381 Although long held in the United States, the close
association of corporations' separate legal status with their separate taxation is arbitrary.
We do not have to tax in this way.38 2 The CBIT would therefore integrate corporate and
shareholder income taxation, taxing that income only once. 383
In addition to eliminating the double corporate tax, integrating as described by the
CBIT would simplify and improve the U.S. income tax system, treat all U.S. entities
equally (except the smallest), treat equity and debt equally, and allow for a reduced corpo-
rate tax rate.384 Together, all of these recommendations would help achieve a revamped
and robust corporate income tax system.
The CBIT would tax at the entity level so that a single level of tax would be collected
on capital income.385 Neither debt holders nor equity holders would be additionally taxed
on this income. 386 Distributions of dividends or interest would not be taxed to sharehold-
ers or investors. 387 Losses would similarly not pass through to shareholders. 388 All corpo-
rate and non-corporate entities (with the exception of those entities with gross receipts of
less than $100,000) would be taxed in this same way. 389
Treating equity and debt equally within the corporate tax system would go a long way
toward removing rule-based distortions from investment financing decisions. 390 It would
help to move investment financing further toward equity than it is currently. This would
consequently encourage capital structures that are less vulnerable to economic instabili-
ties.391 Moreover, according to the Treasury Department Report, distortions in the cur-
377. Id.
378. I.R.C. §§ 11, 301, 7701(a)(4).
379. INTEGRATION, supra note 9, at 1.
380. I.R.C. § 11; INTEGRATION, supra note 9, at 1.
381. I.R.C. § 301; INTEGRATION, supra note 9, at 1.
382. See INTEGRATION, supra note 9, passim (providing four examples of ways to integrate individual and
entity taxation).
383. Id. at 39-40.
384. Id. at 39-60.




389. Id. at 41-43.
390. Id. at vii.
391. Id.
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rent law raise the cost of capital for investment.392 These integration changes could help
to reduce capital costs. 393
Combining CBIT integration with this paper's other recommendations would help to
create a wholly simplified U.S. income tax system that supports a healthy economy. The
changes outlined here would contribute strength and dynamism to the U.S. position at
home and abroad.
V. Conclusion
The U.S. corporate income tax system and its international provisions are failing.394
International business dealings are growing exponentially. 395 MNEs are evolving as inte-
grated economic units that defy jurisdictional-based income concepts. 396 Meanwhile, the
U.S. corporate tax system's static prescriptive provisions are tied to outdated immobile
business ideas and land-based jurisdictional notions.397 Gaps in the rules related to these
static concepts allow abusive deferral. 398 As a result, billions-or possibly trillions-of
dollars in potential U.S. income sits indefinitely offshore in foreign tax jurisdictions. 399
All the while, the U.S. tax rate is "uncompetitively high."400
Taxes have grown from domestic concerns to global commodities, 4 1 but the U.S. rates
and rules are comparatively over burdensome. 4 2 Our rules are widely recognized as un-
wieldy and unworkable.403 Compliance is expensive.4°4 The tax burden is so heavy that
the rules are worth exploiting and avoiding, even at great cost. 40 5 Further, the rules them-
392. Id.
393. Id.
394. See supra discussion in Parts I and IIl.
395. See Desai & Hines, supra note 1, at 937-39.
396. Benshalom, supra note 4, at 633-51.
397. Miller, supra note 4, at 5 (noting that the anti-deferral rules were intended to regulate immobile busi-
ness income that is actually mobile); see Holmes, supra note 1, passim (relating the prescriptive nature of the
Code and regulations); see also Benshalom, supra note 4, passim (highlighting the sourcing issues related to
outdated, geographic jurisdictional notions).
398. Miller, supra note 4, passim.
399. See Shaviro, supra note 4, at 380 (stating that U.S. MNEs have more than $10 trillion invested abroad);
see also Drucker, upra note 122 (stating that U.S. multinationals are sitting on $1.375 trillion in foreign
subsidiary earnings).
400. See Durst, supra note 4, at 314.
401. See OECD REPORT, supra note 14, passim (presenting issues related to international tax competition).
402. See, e.g., JEC, supra note 3 (stating that, "[U].S. corporate tax laws have grown into a patchwork of
overly complex, inefficient, and unfair provisions .... "); Desai & Hines, supra note 1, at 937-38 (explaining
that today's tax rules represent yesterday's realities); Holmes, supra note 1, at 3, 10-15, (noting the complexity
of the prescriptive U.S. tax rules, the international provisions that have not been revised since 1962, and the
general system that has not been overhauled since 1986).
403. See Holmes, supra note 1, at 10-15 (describing the enormous challenges in complying with and adminis-
tering the current rules).
404. TaxpayerAdvocate, supra note 343 (indicating that U.S. taxpayers spend $193 billion in annual planning
and compliance); see Holmes, supra note 1, at 13 (noting that the rules contain hidden compliance costs of
$260 billion on top of the amounts entities spend in tax planning).
405. Holmes, supra note 1, at 13-14 (indicating that entities go to great lengths to circumvent provisions and
exploit loopholes).
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selves do not support a healthy economy.4 0 6 They encourage debt over equity, distort
financial investment decisions, and can contribute to increased economic instability.40 7
Migration of U.S. capital offshore is eroding the U.S. capital tax base.408 Many U.S.
entities prefer to incorporate foreign subsidiaries to avoid the U.S. rules altogether.4
0 9
The effects of these rules cost the United States dearly in revenue, capital, and investment,
and those costs are far reaching.
4 10
Tax lawyers joke that recommending U.S. incorporation verges on malpractice, but
their jokes contain hints of reality. 411 The easier it becomes to do business offshore, the
more the U.S. system becomes a drag on the U.S. economy. The more U.S. capital
moves overseas and stays there, the more deeply the United States must examine its tax
structure to improve revenue, ease of business dealings, and U.S. investment.
These recommendations would improve the U.S. income tax system as a whole, from
the inside out, restoring the United States to a place of strength and competitiveness in
international business and investment. Simplified and clarified rules could reduce compli-
ance costs, and a reduced tax rate across a broader tax base would relieve pressure on
MNEs, other U.S. entities, and U.S. labor. These same changes should increase U.S.
revenue and capital imports.4 12 Increased U.S. capital imports may even strengthen U.S.
stock values, helping to improve many American savings accounts.
413
For these reasons, I recommend a restructured U.S. corporate income tax system that
places the international provisions and related concepts at its core. Revamped rules
should include the following: (1) new entity definitions and source rules that reflect evolv-
ing business realities, broaden the U.S. tax base, and help to close the gaps that allow
deferral; (2) a strengthened worldwide income tax system to encompass border-defying
transactions and value creation; (3) principles-based standards to simplify and clarify the
rules and to allow the rules to remain dynamic and relevant; (4) ending deferral to return
U.S. capital and revenue to the United States; (5) lowering the overall tax rate to relieve
the base and to improve U.S. investment returns; and (6) integrating the corporate and
individual income tax systems as outlined by the CBIT prototype.4 14 The CBIT would
tax all U.S. entities at the entity level, would treat debt and equity equally, and would
improve overall ease of business in the United States. Together, these recommendations
would constitute an income tax regime overhaul for a renewed and revitalized U.S. posi-
tion in global and domestic commerce.
406. INTEGRATION, supra note 9, at vii (noting that the rules encourage entities to over-leverage them-
selves); see Avi-Yonah, supra note 6, at 1577 (describing the imbalance and inequity that occur when the capital
tax base erodes).
407. INTEGRATION, sipra note 9, at vii, 39.
408. JCT, supra note 7, at 69-79.
409. Shaviro, supra note 4, at 378 (describing multinationals wishing to escape the United States for tax
purposes); see Miller, supra note 4, passim (outlining the many incentives for incorporating foreign entities).
410. JCT, supra note 7, passim.
411. Shaviro, supra note 4, at 378.
412. See Durst, supra note 4, at 316 (discussing restoring the United States via the income tax).
413. See id.
414. INTEGRATION, supra note 9, at 39-60.
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